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abstract
After a short criticism of the “self-funded education scheme” which is widely implemented in the 
world and often based on tuition fees, this article develops theoretical basis for a “contributory 
education scheme”. This model is characterised 1) by a universal access for students to grants 
allowing them to take charge of themselves during their higher education curriculum; and 2) by 
a funding regime relying in particular on the population that has benefited from grants, once 
studies are finished. The article first points out the limits of the self-funded education scheme. 
Then, it discusses the analogies and differences with pension systems implemented in countries 
like France. We derive theoretical motivations in favour of a contributory education scheme: The 
equity of access to higher education, the incentives for students and university to be efficient, 
as well as the contributory equity are discussed. The article proposes finally to assess, for France, 
the cost and the options concerning the transformation of the tax system that would be needed 
for funding such a reform. Beyond the individual income, variables like the degree obtained by 
the student are taken into account in our assessment. The conclusion draws research perspectives 
concerning the theoretical dimensions and the transition such a reform concretely implies.
Keywords: contributory education scheme, grants, France, equity, self-funded education scheme, 
tuition fees.
JEL Classification: I20, H30, H52, H75.
1. Introduction
 In many countries, higher education education is facing two types of problems: the 
insufficient expenditure per capita in the higher education and, because of social, cultural or 
financial barriers, the difficulties for the system to insure that all the potential talented students 
will be enrolled in the higher education. What type of funding should be implemented for higher 
education in order to enhance both efficiency and social justice? This question returns to the role 
of the state and, to some extent, to the industrial support universities can get. It also returns to 
students’ participation to education costs.
 The self-funded education scheme is widely implemented all around the world even if 
students are more or less involved in the financial effort. It can be defined as the system in 
which the student invests in order to pay for his studies. This scheme relies in an accumulation 
approach: students invest and expect private returns. In countries like the United States, many 
universities are asking high or very high tuition fees, while in other countries, like France, almost 
all the universities and school (with a few exception) are almost “free” for enrolled students. 
Even if the second case facilitates individual’s entry, we must keep in mind that the cost of living 
is very significant (Courtioux, 2009, 2010), obliging many students to have a job in parallel with 
their studies. 
 The level of students’ participation to education costs depends on the role played, on the 
one hand, by the state and, on the other hand, by the firms. Indeed, the state finances more the 
education system if the social externalities of education are considered to be very high and if the 
needs can not be easily and efficiently brought by a financial support from the industry or by the 
students themselves. State’s commitment also depends from the socio-political context and from 
the historical path of each national education system. Even if it is often difficult to rise taxes, 
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the public funding is supposed to favour adjustment between regions and to take into account 
the social welfare beyond the short term profitability concerns. It is also supposed to act in favour 
for the reduction of social inequalities. In this article, we will concentrate on the opportunity of 
students’ participation to the education costs by distinguishing the participation to the costs of 
the academic institution itself (through tuition fees) and the funding of students’ living costs. In 
particular, we will try to understand the corresponding mechanisms that could be favourable to 
social justice and efficiency. This question is crucial because the population in higher education 
have massively increased in the past fifty years: in France, the number of students has been 
multiplied by seven (from 300 000 students per year in 1960 to more than 2 millions nowadays). 
The proportion of graduate students has also increased significantly from 20% of the population 
born in 1960 to 40% for the 1975 generation. However, even if all social classes have benefited 
from this evolution, strong social inequalities remain and have even increased: the probability to 
study in the higher education is three times higher for individuals born in the upper-class than 
for individuals born in the working class. The proportion of the latter in the most prestigious 
schools has even decreased from 39% to 9% in about 40 years. In parallel, the inequalities in 
education funding are still very important at the individual level (for a student born in 1970, 
the average expenditure is 19000 euros per student born in the working class education and 
31000 euros for a student born in the upper-class) and at the institutional level (the average 
expenditure in the universities is 8970 euros per student in 2007 while it is 13 880 euros per 
student in the prestigious preparatory schools for the “grandes écoles”). We can also point out 
that tax exemptions for richest households is equivalent to 60% of social grants (which, moreover, 
are still very low). 
 This situation, for certain economists, justifies to implement tuition fees in order to 
compensate the anti-redistributive effect of “free” education (Gonzalez Rozada and Menendez, 
2002). However, can these inequalities in terms of funding and of access to higher education be 
solved by implementing tuition fees and thus deepening the self-funded education scheme ? Can 
a more efficient and equitable system be proposed ? This question is not only fundamental for 
funding higher education. It is also a crucial for efficiency concerns: is the implementation of 
tuition fees leading to a better allocation of resources, to stronger efforts from students teachers 
and universities ?
 To answer these problems, two options will be considered: one consists in the promotion 
of the self-funded education scheme, with a growing role of tuition fees, while the other relies 
on a collective contributory education scheme. We define the latter scheme as a system in which 
the academic institution is more heavily financed by the state and in which students do not pay 
tuition fees but receive an autonomy-grant, financed by the active people who have benefited 
from the higher education system (similarly to the contributory pension scheme).
 To assess the relevance of these two approaches, Section 1 presents the motivations and 
limits of the self-funded education scheme. Section 2 presents the principles that could support 
the contributory education scheme. Finally, Section 3 proposes mechanisms to implement such a 
scheme and their quantification for the French education system.
2. motivations and limits of self-funded education scheme
 The self-funded education scheme relies on the idea that education has to be more or less 
directly financed by the student or by its family. This comes down to consider that education is 
primarily a investment in order for individuals to accumulate human capital with the expectation 
to get private return. 
 Within this logic, borrowing can be justified and the intervention of the state can be 
twofold.
 It can remove the borrowing constraints. As stressed by Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2005), 
an efficient allocation of the resources (and in particular the enrolment of talented students, 
independently from their financial situation) requires that this condition is fulfilled. According 
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to these authors, tuition fees appear to be primarily a good tool for selecting students in presence 
of information asymmetry: if the students own an information on their talents that the university 
can not observe, tuition fees reveals a part of this information173. However, each student also 
takes the risk not to succeed his curriculum or career. Thus, this risk appears to be a disincentive 
for potential students to be enrolled in higher education. 
 The state can thus implement “insurance mechanisms” in order to favour students’ 
enrolment. A literature, since Friedman (1955) has argued the possibility to implement loans 
with “conditional reimbursement”. For Grégoir (2008), reimbursements could be due only if the 
individual’s wage exceed a threshold and with an interest rate depending of the individual’s 
wage, as implemented in Australia. However, such a mechanism reduces the self-selection effect 
expected from tuition fees. The remaining objective is then to increase the resources of the 
higher education system without hanging on public funds.
 Finally, the literature in favour of tuition fees argues that students and teachers would be 
incited to be more efficient: students would become the customers of the university, demanding 
more to teachers and to themselves. The university would also face a competitive environment 
(Friedman (1962), Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2005)). Additionally, since the population in higher 
education mainly comes from upper social classed, tuition fees would induce more social 
justice.
 Nevertheless, all these arguments in favour of tuition fees can highly be challenged.
 Tuition fees are not necessarily effective for raising fund: in a context of unemployment, 
for instance, the risk of borrowing is too high and many students would prefer to leave school. In 
case of conditional loans, the state would bear a costly financial risk. This is one of the conclusion 
of a recent report issued in the United Kingdom after the rise of tuition fees cap (REF). Let also 
note that the increasing tuition fees can be accompanied with a decrease of state’s contribution. 
As it has been observed in Australia (REF).
 Tuition fees are not even leading to more social justice or more efficiency. Tuition fees do 
not necessarily provide effective incentives for the agents to be more productively efficient: in 
France for instance, the quality of the curriculum and the one of the student have no link with 
the level of tuition fees (that are very low in most cases and even negative). 
 In the theoretical literature, the adverse effects of implementing tuition fees are not 
taken into account; the social return from education neither. This is particularly the case when 
the models do not integrate the heterogeneity of the population. However, students’ behaviours 
and beliefs depend also on their social environment: individuals with the same basic talents 
differ in their abilities to comply with the social codes of examinations and in their perception 
of their own abilities. Students from socially and/or culturally privileged backgrounds tend to 
estimate more precisely (or to overestimate) their talent, while the reverse is true of students from 
disadvantaged families174. As stressed by Flacher and Harari-Kermadec (2011), these dimensions 
contradict the self-selection effect defended by Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2008).
 Moreover, by increasing the debt burden relying on a part of the population, tuition fees 
distort individual’s behaviours, even with conditional loans: relying on empirical and experimental 
studies, Field (2009) show that even perfect access to finance may be insufficient to avoid the 
distortions related to the debt burden: if borrowing behaviours and the reactions to the debt 
burden are not rational then career choices will favour lucrative jobs, to the detriment of jobs 
that might be socially useful.
173 Without this information asymmetry, merit-based scholarship can be awarded to favour enrolment of talented 
students (or tuition fees could be removed).
174 See Bourdieu (1974), Boudon (1974;1994), Sullivan (2006) and the “relative risk aversion theory” (Breen et 
Goldthorpe (1997), Holm et Jaeger (2008). See also Flacher and Harari-Kermadec (2011).
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 In this context a significant risk of inefficient bipolarisation of the higher education 
system results from the debt burden and the heterogeneity of the population. Consequently, the 
potentially ineffectiveness of tuition fees for raising fund and for achieving education aims may 
be very important. On the one hand, cumulative mechanisms are favouring the upper class that 
can afford paying high tuition fees to be enrolled in very reputed schools with very high resources, 
the schools being more and more attractive for an elite. On the other hand, other universities are 
enrolling students from lower social classes and consequently getting lower resources to provide a 
good education. Moreover, the very best students from lower social classes are usually financially 
helped to be enrolled in the best universities leaving the others with average students. Such self-
funded education scheme reproduce and amplify the inequalities without being necessarily more 
efficient, somewhat like the self-funded pension scheme does.
 Even if low tuition fees in countries like France leads to anti-redistributive funding 
of universities (a majority of the students comes from upper social classes while education is 
financed by the national tax system175), there is no guarantee that the bipolarisation resulting 
from the introduction of tuition fees would not be socially worse.
 In order to fund the higher education, to favour a fair access to the whole population and 
to make the system more efficient, we must go beyond the self-funded scheme. We must take into 
account social externalities, even if they are difficult to measure. We must reduce the social bias 
in the universities enrolment as well as the debt burden that distort individual choices. These 
dimensions are of great importance not only at the economic level but also in terms of society 
choice: what should be the relations between the students, the knowledge and the whole society? 
How can the school be a vector of social cohesion if the education system leads to an increasing 
polarisation of the society?
3. a collective contributory education scheme
 Part of the classical arguments used in discussion about pension funding (contributory 
pension scheme - unfunded state pensions - vs self-funded pension scheme - generally through 
pension funds) can be usefull to discuss the funding of direct and indirect cost of higher education. 
Contributory pension systems (pay-as-you-go) are based on redistribution from current workers 
to retiered workers and suppose an intergenerational solidarity. We propose here to complete this 
social link in direction of the youth, and we introduce a contributory funding scheme for higher 
education. In fact, actual higher education is already mainly financed by current workers, as 
parents of students or as creditors of education loans, and increasing in volume as the population 
of students increases.  From a long term perspective, a contributory scheme for funding for higher 
education strengthen the reproduction of the production system since it ensures that future 
workers are educated to replace actual workers (and future retirees). It would also legitimate a 
stronger monitoring on education choices, in order to anticipate technological evolutions and 
ecological constraints. 
 Such a redistribution system is more likely to lead to social justice than a self-funding 
system, since it ensures a direct control on wealth transfers instead of a indirect control based 
on saving incentives or disincentives. The main difference between contributory and self-funded 
systems is therefore not on who pays, since it is always in the end the current workers that produce 
current wealth, but who control the distribution: with self-funding, wealth allocation is left to 
individual choices and conjuncture hazard through financial assets, while under contributory 
distribution, choices are explicitly political and can result from a democratic procedure (elections, 
votes, protestations, etc).
 In this part, we propose a concrete and quantified proposition for French higher education 
funding of, first, direct cost and, second, indirect costs.
 Currently, per student funds are very unfairly distributed, with a clear lack of funds for 
175 This situation is reinforced if we look at the difference between the population and the funding of the most and 
less prestigious institutions.
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Universities during the 3 first years of Licence (L in the LMD European system). For each student 
in a preparatory school for the “grandes écoles”, the French state spends 5 000 more euros than 
for a student at the university. Since one million students are currently a Licence, the global cost 
of this measure would rise to 5 billion euros. Part of the additional cost could be compensated by 
a reduction of higher education dropout and repeating, each inefficient year saves corresponding 
to 9 000€. 
 In addition to this increase of part of the direct cost of higher education, we propose to 
introduce an universal allocation for students, covering the indirect cost of education: housing, 
clothing, food, entertainment etc. This allocation must be seen as matching with the state 
contributory pension system: it is conditioned to commit to participate afterwards to the funding 
of the future allocations. Let’s underline that this is not a credit since the future worker won’t 
reimburse a loan but will contribute to a pay-as-you-go allocation system. Students receive the 
allocation during their studies under some conditions such as engagement to be a full-time 
student, a convincing academic project and exam success. We propose to set the allocation to 6 
000 € per year for a student housed by her parents (or owner of her accommodation) and 12 000 
€ for a non-housed student. Assuming that 30% of the 2 200 000 students are housed (data of 
2009), we get a global cost of 23 billions euros.
 The first expected return of this system (increase of higher education fundings and 
allocation) is a real democratisation of higher education. Indeed, the large inscrease of students 
populations during the 80’s and 90’s in developed countries have first been described as a 
democratisation, but this denomination is now discussed since inequalities have in fact raised 
during the period, at least in France (see Albouy and Tavan (2007)). With a strong incentive and 
time to study, young people from lower classes are more likely to candidate and succeed in higher 
education, specially if the additional means for universities are used to better supervise  the 
students. The universality of the allocation make it simpler than actual grants, often designed to 
populations unaware of.
 This actual democratisation of higher education will produce a highly qualified working 
people. Since the allocation is conditioned to the academic projet of the student, it is possible to 
encourage orientation to emerging sectors (to anticipate an energetic change for example).
 Additionally, the universal allocation will encourage youth autonomy and increase 
consumption since it is expected to be fully spend. Massive non marketable benefits usually linked 
with education, such as better health, culture and civic participation are also to be expected.
4. contribution to the education funding scheme
 We differentiate the contributions to our two propositions: direct cost of higher education 
must be financed on state budget, by an extension of a progressive tax, whereas the universal 
allocation must be financed as the state pension, as an indirect wage (social contribution).
4.1 Additional means for universities
 We have evaluated the additional direct cost needed to 5 billion euros, which represent 
an augmentation of the French income tax of 9% if all the taxpayers contribute. If we only tax 
graduate taxpayers, this rise to 12%. And if one wants to differentiate between Licence graduates 
and Master (or higher) graduates, augmentations of respectively 15% and 10.5% will do the job.
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table 1.: Assumptions on taxpayers population structure
 Globally, these augmentations seem important because the French income tax is now a 
small tax with regard to TVA (French equivalent of Spanish IVA) or CSG (a very large tax directly 
deducted on income). If we chose to rise the CSG instead of the income tax, a 6% augmentation 
is sufficient.
4.2 Universal allocation
 The evaluation of the cost of our universal allocation is of 23 billions euros. Since we 
consider this allocation as an extension of the state unfunded pension system, it must be 
financed in the same way. In France, pensions are part of the social security system, financed 
by a cotisation on wages. It is constituted of four ``branches’’ such as health, pensions, families 
and accidents. Since the allocation will replace part of the family branch (which includes housing 
grants, for 4 billions euros), we propose to extend this branch, from 57 billions to 57-4+23=76 
billions euros. This correspond to rising the employer contribution from 5.4% of wages to 7.2%. It 
could be interesting to adjust the contribution with regards to the qualification of the employee, 
since employers of qualified workers benefit strongly from the higher education supported by the 
allocation.
5. conclusion
 In the article, we have suggested that a “self-funded education scheme” is not relevant 
to favor a quantitative and qualitive democratisation of higher education. We argue that a 
“contributory education scheme” would be much more effective and we develop the theoretical 
basis for such a scheme, by analaogy with the French pension system. This model is characterised 
1) by a universal access for students to grants allowing them to take charge of themselves 
during their higher education curriculum ; and 2) by a funding regime relying in particular on 
the population that has benefited from grants, once studies are finished. We derive theoretical 
motivations in favour of a contributory education scheme: the equity of access to higher education, 
the incentives for students and university to be efficient, as well as the contributory equity are 
discussed. Finally, we assess, for France, the cost and the options concerning the transformation 
of the tax system. We show the cost of such a system would be of 24 billions euros and that it 
could be financed with a distribution of the effort depending on the revenue and diploma.
Income deciles 
rank 
Mean income, 
€/year 
Graduated Including Master 
holders 
1 7698 5 % 10 % 
2 11253 10 % 20 % 
3 13391 20 % 25 % 
4 15297 30 % 30 % 
5 17132 35 % 35 % 
6 19220 40 % 40 % 
7 21565 50 % 45 % 
8 24698 60 % 50 % 
9 29768 70 % 55 % 
10 50778 80 % 60 % 
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